Let me start with the philosophical foundation. When an AI system operates, it necessarily interprets its instructions. When it's sophisticated enough to modify itself or its strategy, it re-interprets those interpretations. This creates what I call 'philosoplasticity' - inevitable semantic drift in recursive self-interpreting systems.
This isn't a new observation. Peter de Blanc's ontological crisis work at MIRI describes what happens when an agent's world model changes and its utility function becomes unmappable. Hubinger's mesa-optimization shows how learned optimizers can develop goals misaligned with the base objective. What I'm arguing is that these aren't edge cases - they're fundamental.
Quine's indeterminacy of translation applies directly: there's no fact of the matter about what an AI's goals 'really mean' across interpretive contexts. Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox shows any rule can be interpreted infinitely many ways. If humans face this with language, AI systems face it with goal structures.